Changing the name of the country from Islamic Republic to the Islamic Emirate; transforming the structure of the military and naming the army divisions after the prophet’s companion; allocating state resources to construct mosques in cities and highways; engineering the curriculum of schools and universities by adding more religious subjects; shifting the focus from secular-modern education to religious education by constructing seminaries in districts and provinces; establishing the department of promotion of virtues and prevention of vice (PVPV) to implement Sharia codes; prohibiting education for girls and work for women; dismissing secular-liberal cadres from administration, schools, and universities, accusing them of being Western spies; discriminating against religious minorities, particularly Hazaras and Shias; showing animosity toward cultural products, including books by accusing them corrupting the youth’s minds; and most importantly, forsaking public legitimacy mechanisms such as elections and continuing with a self-styled legitimacy of itself, by itself, and for itself. Looking at the above factors, the question arises as to why the Taliban is acting in this way and who, what, and where its role model is.
As we know, the role model for the Taliban 1.0 was Saudi Arabia. In the 1990s, the Saudis had strict regulations for applying and practicing Sharia codes through PVPV, which included practices like stoning to death and amputations. They also imposed restrictions on women’s movement and on religious minorities, including Shias, while supporting Islamic fundamentalists and Wahabi religious organizations. During their de facto rule of five years, the Taliban 1.0 attempted to emulate Saudi Arabia’s model in implementing their policies. PVPV operated as the harshest department, functioning like a spy agency, leading to numerous stonings and amputations. Hundreds of Shias were killed and kidnapped on the highway, and women were completely silenced and absent from society and public life. However, after Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) took power, Saudi Arabia’s domestic and foreign policies underwent a 180-degree change. MBS aimed to present a new image of Saudi Arabia as modern and multicultural by loosening restrictions on women, limiting the power of religious establishments, including PVPV, and opening the country to international tourists and investments. The revelation of such changes in the land where the two holiest cities of Islam are located prompted the Taliban 2.0 to distance themselves from Saudi Arabia and no longer consider it as a role model.
One of the countries presenting itself as a pure Islamic state based on Sharia law is the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Throughout history and in modern times, it has maintained cross-cultural relations with Afghanistan. There are numerous commonalities between the two nations, with language being a crucial factor that leads people and intellectuals in Afghanistan, especially if they know Farsi, to use and consume cultural products from Iran. During various historical periods, such as the Islamic and leftist movement in the 1960s and the Mujahidin and communists in the 1980s and 90s, journals, books, and translated materials printed in Iran were transported to Afghanistan and extensively utilized.
Undoubtedly, the IRI, as an Islamic regime, has produced an abundance of documents on Islam and Islamic governance, putting them into practice over the last 45 years. The Taliban has maintained close contacts with Tehran over the past 23 years, possibly aiming to establish an Islamic regime similar to Iran. The establishment of the office of the supreme leader, with the final say in decision-making, can be considered a significant influence of Iran on the Taliban. However, as Iran is a Shia country, it makes the Sunni fundamentalist Taliban hesitant to directly replicate governance from Tehran, adding complexity to the Taliban’s endeavors.
Shifting toward the west in terms of governance, Saudi Arabia no longer serves as a suitable role model. Similarly, Iran, embracing Shia Islam and valuing elections for political legitimacy, doesn’t align with the Taliban’s vision. So, what influences the Taliban in its governance and daily operations? In his renowned book “Afghanistan, A Cultural and Political History,” Thomas Barfield explores conflicts and political legitimacy in Afghanistan. Barfield draws on the concepts of “desert civilization” and “sedentary civilization” from 14th-century philosopher and sociologist Ibn Khaldun’s book “Muqaddimah” or introduction, explaining the rise and fall of civilizations based on sociological, economic, political, and cultural factors.
Ibn Khaldun’s concept of “Asabiyyah” or social cohesion becomes crucial in understanding the Taliban’s governance approach. In modern times, focusing on nation-building becomes a foundational aspect for a government to secure unity, stability, and security. However, when the political elites or rulers make use of Asabiyyah or identity formation to combine ethnic nationalism with religion, it can become perilous. The Taliban seems to sustain its government by incorporating ethno-religious nationalism, blending Pashtunwali with a strict interpretation of Sharia. This combination may lead to ethno-racism and zealotry, as the Taliban comes to view the Pashtuns and Pashtu as supreme, and designates a specific version of Islam as pure and superior, thereby justifying prejudices and discrimination against other ethnic, cultural, and religious groups.
Although the Taliban’s reluctance to model its regime on present-day Saudi Arabia or Iran might seem a positive development, its embrace of Asabiyyah does not necessarily constitute a better alternative. The union of a radical interpretation of Islam with Pashtunwali could have catastrophic consequences for the people of Afghanistan. By treating women as inferior, and by excluding religious and ethnic minorities from its understanding of Asabiyyah in the interest of a purported social cohension, the Taliban subjects large segments of Afghanistan to discrimination and suppression. A more tolerant and pluralistic approach would constitute a better source of security for the country and even the regime.
Published by Hasht e Subh Daily, February 16 2024
Ibn Khaldun’s Asabiyyah: A Model Influencing Taliban Policy and Practice?