In the early morning of September 30, 2022, in the western part of Kabul mostly populated by the Hazara ethnic group, suicide bombers gunned down the gatekeepers to the Kaj Educational Center and then after entering the school detonated their bombs, killing 53 people, of whom 46 were girls, and injuring 110 (Afghanistan International, 2022). The incident happened in a classroom with a seating capacity of five to seven hundred. Class was in session, the students preparing for the national entrance exam for universities (kankor). Hazara activists subsequently launched a Twitter campaign with the hashtag #StopHazaraGenocide that was shared more than 10 million times (Persian Euro News, 2022). Writers, singers, poets, and human right activists from Afghanistan and around the world joined the campaign, expressing sympathy toward the Hazaras. In the meantime, thousands participated in protests organized by the Hazara diaspora in more than 93 cities across the globe, carrying placards that proclaimed “Being Hazara Is Not Crime”, “Silence Kills More”, “Why the UN Ignores the Hazara Genocide,” and “Stop Hazara Genocide.” Despite these efforts, the targeted killing of Hazaras has not stopped and has in fact increased. It seems that the cry to stop Hazara genocide falls on deaf ears.
A blame game has ensued regarding the Kaj Center massacre, and the perpetrators remain unknown. But regardless of who carried out the attack, the real responsibility lies with the current Taliban regime, as it is the government’s duty to ensure the security of the people. Those who committed the crime aimed to terrorize the Hazara community, but even such violence will not stop the Hazaras’ quest for education, as they believe that the road to prosperity, humanity, and being a good citizen and neighbor comes through the pursuit of knowledge. Indeed, the mother of one of the victims stated, “Our will is that our children study and develop. We are not afraid of death” (Azadi Radio, 2022).
Atrocities against Hazaras across history
Before the establishment of the country called Afghanistan in the hands of Pashtuns in 1747, Hazaras, like other indigenous groups, were autonomous in Khurasan, or Eastern Iran. For 150 years Pashtun rulers followed a decentralized system of governance, allowing for the survival and autonomy of non-Pashtuns, including Hazaras. However, Abdurrahman Khan (1880-1901) introduced a strict centralized system of governance. He initiated war against the autonomous region and after three wars fought against Hazaras from 1891 to 1893, killed and enslaved them and confiscated their lands, distributing those lands among nomad Pashtuns. Sixty percent of the Hazara population perished (Lee, 2018, P.399) and large numbers were both internally displaced and crossed into Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia. In his decree Abdurrahman clearly asks his army to “try to not let them survive and take from them the slaves and concubines as much as you can” (Buda, 2015). Those who did survive were pushed into less fertile lands and mountainous regions of central Afghanistan.
The emergence of the Taliban regime in the 1990s evoked memories of Abdurrahman for the Hazaras. A Taliban official in Mazar-e-Sharif, where the Taliban massacred Hazaras in 1998, announced through a mosque speaker that “Hazara Shias have three choices: convert to Sunni Islam, leave for Iran, or be ready to die” (Rashid, 200. pp:74). After 2001 and the establishment of a democratic regime, Hazaras continued to suffer from discrimination and, from 2010 on, targeted killings.
From June 2010 to September 2022, 55 terrorist attacks against Hazaras killed 1172 people and severely injured 2302 (Kabul Now, 2022). The average number of annual attacks against the group is 4.5 and the average number of annual casualties is 191 people. The number of such incidents in 2022, with the Taliban in power, is 11 – and the year has yet to be completed. This is already almost three times higher than the average and demonstrates that Hazaras are much more insecure under the Taliban regime. The 2022 victims were all civilians: women, men, girls, boys, and fetuses. The attacks were car bombings in Hazara neighborhoods, suicide bombings in mosques and educational centers, and highway kidnappings and subsequent beheadings.
Why have the Hazaras been targeted?
There are a variety of reasons the Hazaras are targeted, but three factors are most prominent: race-ethnicity, religion-sect, and civic values. First, Hazaras are racially and ethnically different from the majority Aryan race in Afghanistan. They are Turkic-Mongolian, which can make them identifiable. Although the Hazaras consider themselves indigenous to Khurasan, the popular (and unverified) history of Afghanistan classifies them as descendants of Genghis Khan, who invaded the region in 1219. As Afghans feel enmity toward Genghis Khan and the Mongols, this enmity is projected onto the Hazaras. Pseudo historians even attach their name to the Persian word hazar, meaning one thousand, to connect the group with the story that Genghis Khan left 1,000 of his armyin Afghan territory, whose descendants became Hazaras. Today the Hazara population in Afghanistan reaches at least 6 million, and this does not include Hazaras in Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere. It is impossible that in 800 years 1,000 people became more than six million. Such historical fabrications represent Hazaras as aliens imposed by the Mongol invaders. As a result, Hazaras have experienced severe discrimination across history forced them them to change their identity to Tajik and Uzbek. Yet even those who changed their identity still face discrimination.
Second, the majority of Hazaras in Afghanistan are Shia (Imamiya), though because of past atrocities large numbers have converted to Sunni Islam or have become Ismailiya Shia. This factor has contributed to Hazara suppression and discrimination. After the dissolution of the Nadiri dynasty of Iran (Persia) and the emergence of Afghanistan in 1747, Afghanistan’s Pashtun rulers were suspicious of Shia Iran, and this continues to this day. These rulers painted Iran as an enemy and anyone in the country connected to Iran in terms of religion, culture, or language were considered suspect.
In the past and present, Pashtun nationalists have been focused on Farsi and Shia Islam, attempting to marginalize Farsi and replace it with Pashtu, but the Farsi language’s richness prevented them from erasing it from Afghan society and culture. Likewise, Shias have been marginalized, ignored, and suppressed in Afghanistan. Up to the middle of the twentieth century, Shias had to hold religious ceremonies in secret, away from the eyes of government officials. As Hazaras speak Farsi and are mostly Shia Imamiya, they are often called Iranian jasos, meaning spies. Certain Sunni radical extremists call for Shias as Rafidhis to be killed. According to Sunnis, Rafidhis reject the first two caliphs Abu-Bakr and Omar and instead consider Ali successor to the prophet Mohammad. Abdurrahman Khan (1880-1901) issued a fatwa against Hazaras and their subsequent genocide was based on the idea of Rafidhi. The Taliban likewise carried out massacres and ethnic cleansing of Hazaras in the 1990s and early 2000s and were influenced by the term. Today, when ISISK, or Daesh, takes responsibility for attacks against Hazaras it justifies the act based on this religious term.
Third, that Hazaras prefer the pen to the gun has made them vulnerable. Hazaras, like other ethnic groups, were heavily armed during the Jihad and the civil war in the 1990s. In the 1980s and 1990s Hazaras fought three times, once against the Soviet Union, then the Mujahidin, and then the Taliban. When the Soviets were expelled and the Mujahidin took power in 1992, they denied the Hazaras rights. When the Taliban then emerged as a radical Sunni group hostile to Shia and Hazaras, Hazaras stood against them and fought until the Taliban killed their leader, Abdul Ali Mazari.
After 9/11 and the establishment of a democratic regime Hazaras embraced civic and government initiatives. They joined the disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating (DDR) program and cooperated with the government, surrendering all their guns and ammunition. A farewell to the gun and friendship with the pen both benefited and harmed Hazaras. Among ethnic groups in Afghanistan, it allowed them to attain the highest literacy rate; enroll the largest number of students in public universities; and build educational infrastructures in their own region. The result was the transformation of the family and social fabric of the group, and Hazaras in general became more liberal and open minded. On the other hand, the loss of familiarity with guns and violence made them vulnerable to targeted killings. Prior to 9/11, Hazaras took part in the “eye for an eye” philosophy of Afghan tribal society, but afterward they pursued their rights through civic means. Certain segments of Afghan society do not support this change and prefer to retain rigid tribal social structures. They consider Hazaras’ turn toward civic-ness a product of the West and by targeting Hazaras believe they are safeguarding their tribal values.
Reactions
Hazara communities have reacted differently over time regarding atrocities against them. They started with documentation, then arm resistance and finally civilian protests. First, the only recourse Hazaras had in response to their nineteenth-century genocide at the hands of Abdurrahman Khan was to document it. Hazara intellectuals historicized the genocide and detailed the wars against the group and the accompanying atrocities, such as massacres, rape, slavery, and displacement. Faiz Mohammad Katib Hazara, for instance, wrote the Seraj-Al-Tawarikh, and later in the twentieth century Haj Kazim Yazdani authored the Pajohish-e- Dar Tarikh-e- Hazara. Second, in response to the atrocities of the Mujahidin and later the Taliban in the 1990s and early 2000s, Hazaras engaged in armed conflict.
Third, after 2001 and in the last 20 years, Hazaras have mainly used civic means to respond to targeting and discrimination. Two major social movements emerged, the first of which was the Tabassom Movement, which saw large numbers of people pouring into the streets of Kabul in November 2015 (British Broadcasting Company, 2015). This was a reaction to seven Hazaras who were abducted and later beheaded in southern Afghanistan, including Shukria Tabassom, an eleven-year-old girl. The second was the Enlightenment Movement, which emerged in July 2016 in Kabul against the discriminatory government policy toward Hazaras and the Hazara region. The protest, which was attended by hundreds of thousands, was attacked by suicide bombers who killed more than 80 people (British Broadcasting Company, 2016).
The Hazara diaspora has also organized protests in major cities around the world. Likewise, Hazara activists have increased their presence and activity on social media, particularly Twitter, by creating the hashtag #StopHazaraGenocide, which has reached millions. Recently, the hashtag was tweeted and retweeted more than 10 million times (Persian Euro News, 2022).
Any time Hazaras are targeted, Hazara intellectuals ask whether the group should continue with nonviolence or change course and use violence. It seems that Hazaras are at a crossroads. With Hazaras surrounded by the Taliban, taking up arms may in fact make them more vulnerable, but at the same time organizing protests and social media activism are like cries falling on deaf ears. But due to the current context, nonviolent protest may serve the Hazaras better.
Solutions
The most recent targeted killings of Hazaras in Afghanistan in which 43 young female students were killed will not be the last incident that targets Hazaras. The responsibility to protect them lies with the current Taliban regime, which as the central authority must safeguard the security of all the country’s people. The Taliban must be pressured to increase security checkpoints in Hazara neighborhoods and to protect Hazara places of worship and educational centers.
The international community must also recognize the Hazara Genocide and the danger the Hazaras face. The United Nation Security Council should take immediate measures to protect the Hazaras as a community. The UN and Security Council should establish a neutral commission to explore the Hazara genocide, and the International Criminal Court should examine the case and try to bring perpetrators to trial to prevent such heinous acts in the future.
References
Afghanistan International. (2022). Death toll in September 30 Attack in Western Kabul Increases to 53, Says UNAMA. Afghanistan International. https://www.afintl.com/en/202210033433
Azadi Radio. (2022). Attack on Kaj Educational Center; Marzieh and Hajar continued Da.Azadiradio. their friendship even after death. https://da.azadiradio.com/a/32067639.html
Al-Faqihi, Shaykh Ali ibn Nasir. (2017). Refuting the Shia Rafidha: Who Are the Rafidha?.Dusunnah.
British Broadcasting Company (2015). Tabassom Movement’s protest against the ‘non-implementation of justice’ for the decapitated Hazara passengers of Hazara.BBC. https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-37950590
British Broadcasting Company. (2016). A suicide attack on the “enlightenment movement” march in Kabul left 80 dead. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2016/07/160723_kk_kabul_power_demo_blast_death_toll
Buda, Asad. (2015). The text of the fatwas blaspheming Hazaras issued by Amir Rahman, on the occasions of the 25th of September, the day which the fatwa was issued. Khurasan Zameen. https://www.khorasanzameen.net/php/read.php?id=3194
https://dusunnah.com/article/who-are-the-rafidha-shaykh-ali-ibn-nasir-al-faqihi
Kabul Now. (2022). Target attack against Hazaras since 2010. Kabul Now. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=424352389811311&set=pcb.424353426477874
Lee, Jonathan.L. (2018). Afghanistan, A History from 1260 to the present. Reaktion Books LTD.
Perisan Euro News. (2022). The Tweeter Campaign against the killing of Hazaras in Afghanistan exceeds 10 million tweets. Euro News. https://per.euronews.com/2022/10/13/twitter-campaign-against-killing-of-hazaras-in-afghanistan-exceeded-10-million-tweets
Rashid, Ahmed (2001), Taliban, Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press
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