On August 15, 2021, the Taliban seized control of Kabul, leading to the collapse of the Afghan government. This date holds different meanings for Afghans. Pro-Taliban factions refer to it as Jashn-i-Azadi, or the celebration of freedom, while for others, it is a dark day that shattered their hopes for a brighter future. The following night brought nightmares for the residents of Kabul, as fear of looting and violence prevented many from sleeping. I happened to be in Istanbul for a conference when the incident occurred. Calls from concerned family and friends flooded in, but there was little we could do except brace ourselves for the worst. Now, a year has passed, and contrary to the Taliban’s narrative, there is no freedom left to celebrate. Physical insecurity plagues the populace, economic hardship looms large, unemployment rates are skyrocketing, inflation is rampant, poverty is pervasive, and lawlessness prevails. The ruling Taliban party has neglected its primary responsibility of meeting people’s needs, instead obsessing over women’s bodies and how to control them.
What promises were made by Taliban officials?
Zabihullah Mujahid, the current Chief Spokesperson of the Taliban regime, held a press conference on August 17, 2021, two days after the takeover. He assured journalists that the future government would be inclusive, representing all sections of society. Regarding the media, he emphasized that they should continue operating within the framework of Islam and Afghan culture, with no interference from external parties. Mujahid also claimed that the Taliban would respect women’s rights and allow them to participate in society in accordance with Islamic principles. In terms of foreign relations, he stated that foreign diplomatic missions in Kabul were safe and secure, implying the Taliban’s interest in maintaining contact and engagement with the international community.
Almost a year later, on July 26, 2022, Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Foreign Minister of the Taliban regime, highlighted the regime’s achievements during the Tashkent conference. He asserted that the Taliban had established security across the country, revitalized security institutions, provided essential services to Afghan citizens, and combated corruption. Muttaqi further claimed that the Taliban had fostered a culture of tolerance and coexistence by offering a general amnesty to all, even those who had fought against them in the previous 20 years, thus ending the cycle of revenge. He mentioned that universities remained open, allowing both boys and girls to pursue higher education. In primary education, schools were operational nationwide, with the Taliban ensuring the necessary support for their smooth functioning. Regarding women, Muttaqi stated that they continued to work in education, healthcare, and other government departments. For those women who lost their jobs, the government pledged to provide salary assistance while they remained at home. Finally, Muttaqi expressed the Taliban government’s determination to transform Afghanistan into a hub of peace, stability, and economic cooperation.
Where are we now?
Currently, the security situation in Afghanistan has undergone a significant transformation. Unlike the past two decades, the country is not engulfed in a major war. Previously, the Taliban themselves were a significant source of instability, engaging in conflicts against the government, bombing public assets, destroying infrastructure, and kidnapping civilians. With the Taliban now in control and governing the country, the expectation was that they would provide security for the population. However, under the Taliban regime, Afghans, particularly religious minorities, are not safe, despite the promises made by Taliban officials. In fact, incidents of bombings and killings have increased.
One distressing example is the targeted attacks on Shia mosques. In October 2021, a suicide attack on a Shia mosque in Kandahar resulted in 30 deaths and 90 casualties. Similarly, in the same month, another suicide attack on a Hazara Shia mosque in Kunduz claimed the lives of 50 individuals, with 100 more injured. In April 2022, a bomb detonated during rush hour near Abdurrahim Shahid high school in western Kabul, killing 20 students, predominantly Shia Hazaras. More recently, a series of bombings targeted the Shia Hazara neighborhood in western Kabul, causing further loss of life and injuries. The Sikh religious minority has also faced systematic targeting by unidentified adversaries under the Taliban regime. Out of the hundreds of thousands of Sikhs in Afghanistan, only a few remain, awaiting resettlement abroad. Like the Hazaras, the Sikh community endures systematic persecution and genocide, necessitating their protection.
The Taliban either lacks the ability or the will to address the sources of threats that pose a significant risk to the physical security of Afghans, particularly religious minorities. According to a report by the Congressional Research Service, several terrorist organizations operate in Afghanistan, including Al-Qaeda (core), Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), the Haqqani Network, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), among potentially others. Evidence suggests that the Taliban maintains close relations with all these terrorist organizations, indicating a lack of interest in suppressing or eradicating them. Notably, Hamza bin Laden, the successor to Osama bin Laden, was killed by Americans in September 2019 while being sheltered by the Taliban. Additionally, the leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was reportedly killed near the Taliban’s Prime Minister Palace in downtown Kabul. Umar Asim, the leader of AQIS, was also killed by Americans in September 2019 within territory controlled by the Taliban. It is concerning that Abdurrahim Muslimdost, the founder and Amir of ISKP, pledged allegiance to the Taliban in April 2022, asserting that their goals align and no confrontation is necessary. Muslimdost, responsible for numerous suicide bombings targeting Shia and Sikh communities, now operates freely in Afghanistan as an ally of the Taliban.
From an economic perspective, Afghanistan has experienced a significant decline in prosperity under the Taliban government, with a bleak future outlook. In May 2022, the Taliban announced an annual budget of $2.6 billion, allocated primarily for day-to-day government expenditures ($2.3 billion) and with a relatively small portion set aside for developmental projects ($313 million).
Disturbingly, data provided by CIGAR reveals that 90% of Afghans face varying levels of food insecurity, and three million children are at serious risk of malnutrition. Unemployment rates are alarmingly high, and the 600,000 individuals entering the job market annually are struggling to find decent employment opportunities. The census indicates that around 500,000 Afghans lost their jobs after the Taliban takeover, severely impacting their livelihoods and purchasing power. Inflation rates are soaring, reaching 15.5%, and household goods are even more severely affected, with prices nearing a staggering 42%. Additionally, Afghanistan is grappling with severe drought and floods this year, further negatively impacting the agricultural sector. To support their families and earn income, many Afghan youth are resorting to dangerous trafficking routes in an attempt to reach neighboring countries and eventually seek refuge in Western nations. While some manage to reach their destinations, countless lives are lost along the way. A significant number of Afghan immigrants currently reside in Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Indonesia, living under deplorable conditions. Those who have made it beyond these countries often find themselves in refugee camps, anxiously awaiting news of their asylum status.
Regarding governance, the Taliban has purportedly addressed corruption to some extent. Given that a substantial portion of government revenue is derived from customs, the new regime has focused on curbing corruption in this area. However, corruption remains prevalent within the overall system, as many Afghans continue to report instances of bribery by Taliban officials when seeking administrative assistance from government offices. In terms of governance innovations, the Taliban has made minimal changes beyond assuming control of pre-existing ministries, departments, and offices. Their actions have primarily involved renaming institutions, such as changing the Ministry of Women to the Ministry of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Furthermore, the Taliban dissolved both the lower and upper houses of parliament, discredited the 2004 constitution, and dismantled the Afghan security forces, including the army, police, and national intelligence agencies. While the Taliban recruited 130,000 individuals for their army and distributed them among nine regional corps across the country, including Kabul, they have yet to announce an alternative body to replace the parliament, nor have they proposed any measures to compensate for the loss of the Afghan constitution.
Typically, an interim government should operate for a period of six months or less, facilitating the establishment of a legitimate and long-term government through elections or other means. However, the Taliban interim regime has surpassed one year without specifying an expiration date or outlining subsequent procedures. The current interim government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many Afghans and has not garnered recognition from the international community. Moreover, it is far from inclusive and is dominated by the Pashtun ethnic group. Anyone who dares to question this imbalance risks facing severe consequences, even individuals within the Taliban ranks. For instance, when Qari Makhdom Alim, an Uzbek Taliban member, clashed with Pashtun Taliban over the rights of Uzbeks in the new administration, he was arrested, tortured, and subsequently released. Similarly, Mawalawi Mahdi, the only Hazara in the Taliban ranks, protested against the lack of Hazara representation in the new government, leading to his murder and the subsequent Taliban military assault on the entire Balkhab district, resulting in large-scale displacement.
Initially, the Taliban appeared to have made some progress in foreign relations as the international community, including the United States, engaged with the new regime. The Taliban sought to convince the world that they would act responsibly and be rational in addressing international concerns. In various interviews, Taliban officials expressed their desire for friendly relations with foreign countries, including the United States. Serajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani Network and current Minister of Interior, stated in an interview with CNN that they would like to have good relations with the United States and the international community, emphasizing that they no longer see them as enemies. Similarly, Mullah Yaqub Mujahid, the son of the Taliban’s founder and the current Minister of Defense, mentioned in an NPR interview that it is evident they want improved relations with the US, arguing that it is in the US interest to recognize the Taliban regime as there is no other viable alternative. The Taliban’s Foreign Minister highlighted “economic centralism” as a pillar of their foreign policy during the Tashkent conference in July 2022, with the aim of transforming Afghanistan into a crossroad of Asia.
However, the Taliban’s honesty came into question when it was revealed that they provided shelter to Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda, who was subsequently killed in Kabul. This incident severely damaged the trust they had built with the international community and posed a significant challenge to their foreign relations. It also jeopardized their relations with neighboring countries and beyond. Pakistan, considered the godfather of the Taliban, refrained from recognizing the new regime and expressed dissatisfaction with the Taliban’s support for Pakistani Taliban (TTP) militants operating from Afghanistan. Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan feel threatened by Central Asian terrorist groups, including the Uzbek Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Tajik Ansarullah, who maintain close ties with the Taliban and operate from Afghan territory. Incidents such as rocket fire from Afghanistan into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have occurred, leading to joint military drills conducted by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan along their borders with Afghanistan in August 2022. Taliban fighters have clashed with Iranian border guards multiple times, resulting in casualties on both sides. While Beijing and Moscow have softened their stance toward the Taliban and shown signs of acceptance, it will likely take more time for China and Russia to officially recognize the Taliban regime.
After one year of Taliban rule, their government has yet to be recognized by any nation worldwide. The killing of Ayman Al-Zawahiri in Kabul further delayed their mission and revealed that the Taliban had misled the international community regarding cutting ties with major terrorist organizations. Unfortunately, there are no signs of improvement in the Taliban’s stance on women’s issues. Afghan girls are still denied access to education, and women are prohibited from working. The Taliban has not fulfilled its commitment to an inclusive government, as the interim government continues to be dominated by Pashtuns, and their plans for the future remain uncertain. The economy has collapsed, foreign terrorist organizations still operate within the country, and instead of addressing Afghanistan’s current problems and providing social services to its citizens, the Taliban appears primarily focused on further restricting women’s rights.