The Consequence of Al Qaida’s presence in Afghanistan for the Taliban and the US

On Saturday, July 31 2022, the leader of Al-Qaida Ayman AL Zawahiri was killed by an American drone in the heart of Kabul, less than a kilometer from the Presidential Palace where the Prime Minister of the Taliban conducts cabinet meetings. Joe Biden, The President of the United States said: “justice has been delivered and the head of terrorists is not anymore.”  The Taliban authority initially denied the drone attack but later Zabihullah Mujahid, the Spokesman of the Taliban confirmed it by saying: “the Islamic Emirate intelligence and securities agencies investigated the incident and came to the conclusion that the United States carried out the attack.”

This incident will have certain consequences for the Taliban as the de facto ruler of Afghanistan. The Taliban would will be blamed for violating the Doha Agreement signed between the US and the Taliban in July 2020 by providing shelter for the chief of Al-Qaida Ayman AL Zawahiri. In the agreement, the Taliban committed to cut its relations with Al-Qaida and to not allow foreign terrorist groups to enter/shelter in Afghanistan. This incident proved that the Taliban still has close relations with Al-Qaida and their claim of fighting against Al-Qaida and ISIS is nothing but propaganda to fool international partners.

Moreover, this incident named and shamed the Taliban in the eyes of the international community, making the relations between the two more tense and raising the latter’s suspicion with the former. If we ignore the women rights’ violation, the Taliban was thinking they have done well till now particularly in terms of security for Afghans. Therefore hoping that the international community would recognize their government soon. At the same time, this incident shall open the eyes of the international community to the reality of Taliban, their sinister nature, and their dealing with most wanted terrorists. This event should be considered as a bell ring near the ear of foreign leaders, that leaving the Taliban and Afghanistan to their would have certain security implications for the region and for the world.

Al-Qaida is still a threat?

Al-Qaida was established in the 1980s by Osama Bin Laden, under the guidance of Abdullah Azzam in Pakistan and during the Jihad of Afghans against the soviet occupation. The West, particularly the US was supporting the Mujahidin, hoping to defeat the red army. At that time, the US and allies were possibly happy of the founding of Al-Qaida because it could mobilize large number of Arab fighters for the war in Afghanistan and attract huge amounts of money in terms of donation and charity from the oil rich gulf countries. The Afghan Jihad won, and the United States defeated its ideological enemy the Soviet Union. Moscow was forced to withdraw all its forces from Afghanistan in 1988 and as a result the Afghan communist regime under President Najibullah collapsed. Afterwards, the US and allies failed to remain engaged with Afghanistan which was left it to its own for decades. The Mujahidin was unable to form a government, resulting in inter parties fights that continued for another decade.

The US ignored the threat posed by thousands of foreign fighters, mostly Arabs, in Afghanistan who had participated the Jihad against Soviet Union. Fearing they would radicalize the society further, the majority of the fighters was banned by their own government to return, including Ben Laden, the head of Al-Qaida by the Saudi Arabia. Since the US had close relations with most of the Arab authoritarian regimes, these fighters believed that the US was advising the Arab dictators to push back and suppress the Arab Mujahidin who fought the war in Afghanistan. The result was Al Qaida’s bombing the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and then committing the 9/11 atrocities in the heart of the US.

Al-Qaida was famous and active in the 1990s and early 2000s but after the killing of Osama Ben Laden in 2011 and the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in 2013, its role and its prestige faded among the extremist groups. Abumasab Alzarqawi initiated his fighting in Iraq in 2004 under the name of Al -Qaida but quickly distanced himself from it, probably knowing that the Al-Qaida no further exists. Jibhatul Nusra was founded in Syria in 2012 and initially demonstrated its affiliation to Al Qaeda but later changed the course and cut the relations. Nowadays, the Al Qaeda affiliates operate in Somalia under the name of Alshabab and probably in Sahara in Africa as well as in Yemen, but it does not seem they were/are being commanded from the central commanding office such as Ayman Alzawihiri’s. To me, Al-Qaida weakened after the death of Osama Ben Laden in 2011 and after the emergence of Islamic State in Iraq and Levant or ISIL.

Al-Qaida or any terrorist groups becomes powerful and dangerous when it makes connections with the government. There, they find shelter, office to operate, bank account to receive and save money, camps to train their militias and other ample resources. Al Qaida operatives including its leader Osama Ben Laden were running and hiding, unable to mobilize and train its forces before the Taliban gave them refuge in 1996. Once they settled in Afghanistan and received the support from the Taliban government, they were able to plan and commit the 9/11 event. Now the killing of Alzawihiri in the heart of Kabul shows that the Al Qaeda is back to Afghanistan and got reunited with the Taliban. There is a high possibility of a future reenergizing, remobilizing, and restructuring of Al Qaida in Afghanistan with the help of the Taliban.

Was it a joint effort of US-Taliban and US-Pakistan?

There are several explanations for how the Al Zawahiri was hunted (. Was it the US alone? Was it a joint effort with Pakistani military establishment? Was the Taliban or a faction of it who disclosed Zawahiri’s hideout?

According to a first explanation, it was the US alone who verified his retreat through the local intelligence operatives, then planed and gunned him down. This might be true because during its presence in Afghanistan, the US built large, and well-trained network of intelligence operatives. No doubt that a big portion of it was destroyed after the US withdrawal. But the Americans built them for the long term that could be instrumental when needed. Some of them might be intruded to the rank of Taliban and can play the dual agents.

A second explanation is the Pakistani military establishment that cooperated with the Americans. Pakistan military establishment always remained close to Washington, and they want to sustain these friendly relations. The establishment and the Americans both worked with each other in the times of Jihad in Afghanistan. Pakistan military was instrumental when the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001. Currently, Pakistan is in needs of money for its shaky economy and to tame the inflation. Islamabad is begging to the International Monetary Fund for funds and for that matter the support of Washington is mandatory. However, at the same time, Pakistanis are unhappy about the Taliban policy toward Pakistani Taliban or TTP. Even Islamabad does not want the Taliban government to get succeeded in Afghanistan, fearing it would inspire the TTP and other Islamists in Pakistan to follow the course. Islamabad wants to sustain the instability in Afghanistan by interrupting the state building and  preventing the emergence of strong government in Kabul.

A third explanation is the collaboration between the Taliban government as a whole or certain factions of it with the US intelligence agency. At a first glance, the Taliban’s action of providing sanctuary for the head of Al Qaida might look against the principle of the Doha Agreement signed between the US and the Taliban. But by trapping and then allowing a US drone to gun him down in Kabul, the Taliban wants to indicate its sincerity in suppressing the Al-Qaida and to build trust with the US. If the Taliban had not been done this cooperation with the US unitedly, perhaps the Kandahari faction of Taliban under the leadership of Mullah Baradar would have done it. this faction is a bit moderate and eager to work with the international community. The Kandahari faction has been in odds with extremist Haqqani network under the leadership of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the current Minister of Interior of the Taliban government.  The Haqqani network is more radical and was responsible for most of  deadly suicide bombings in 20 years of US occupation. This network has a long history of relationship with Al Qaida and other Arab extremists dating back to the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s. The safe house to Alzawahiri was offered by the Haqqani network and protected by its militants. Doing so, the Kandahari faction wanted to name and shame the Haqqani network in the eyes of the international community and as a result further marginalize them in the current politics of Afghanistan. However, looking to the above three accounts and considering the statement of the US Foreign Secretary Antony Blinken, indicates  that the US has done the drone attack independently or with the help of Pakistanis. Blinken said: hosting and providing shelter to the head of Al Qaeda “grossly violated” the Doha Agreement.

The outcome for the US and the Taliban

The outcomes of the drone attack and killing of the head of Al-Qaida both for the US and Taliban depends on the narratives of joint efforts explained. If we proceed according to the first narrative of US independency in eliminating the Al Zawahiri then it indicates a great shift in American counter terrorism that has been called the “above the horizon strategy.”  This incident makes the US more vigilant in Afghanistan against the possible Taliban-Al-Qaida hidden cooperation. The Taliban will become more cautious and  they will enhance its counterintelligence operation to reveal the US intelligence network in Afghanistan. Taliban would consider the former Afghan security forces as possible collaborators therefore target them. Arrest, interrogation, torture, imprisonment and even murder of those the Taliban become suspicious of, shall be the business of the day in future.

Based on this account, the Taliban would be the great loser. Taliban would:

  • be known as a liar; the trust Taliban gained with the West, particularly with the US in the last year would end;
  • the matter of recognition of the Taliban government will be postponed if not forgotten
  • the level of suspicion toward the Taliban shall be increased
  • the claim of the Taliban’s armed opposition would be emboldened
  • and the international humanitarian agencies would be cautious in dealing with Taliban.

If the second account of cooperation between Washington and Islamabad in trapping and hunting Al Zawahiri is right, it signifies that Washington built close cooperation with Pakistan’s military establishment, leaving behind the long years of distrust between the two. Except for the invasion time in 2001, Islamabad played a dual game against Washington during the years of US presence in Afghanistan. During these years, Pakistan always condemned the Taliban through statements but practically allowed them to operate freely in Pakistan and to treat their injured in Pakistani hospitals. Based on this explanation, the Taliban would not benefit  from Washington-Islamabad  collaboration but shall suffer from it. The hiding agenda of Taliban in sponsoring terrorism, its close cooperation with terrorists’ groups, its unreliability, and finally it proves that the Taliban government cannot be a forthcoming member of the international community. Pakistanis once again proved that the road to Afghanistan passes through Pakistan. If the international community want to deal and engage with Afghanistan it is the Pakistan, they have to deal and talk to, not the leadership in Afghanistan. Islamabad  did the same during Afghan Jihad and during the first Taliban rule in the 1990s. At that time, Pakistan was the sole agent, representing the Mujahidin and Taliban in international forums.

The third story of Taliban cooperation with the US, probably would have certain positive implications for the Taliban. It implies that Taliban learned from the past and therefore do not want the history to repeat. The first Taliban government (1996-2001) collapsed because the Taliban resisted to extradite Osama Ben Laden to Washington when the US concluded he was responsible for 9/11. Currently the Taliban do not want to take the risk of its predecessor again. The Taliban collaboration in killing Al Zawahiri would build trust with the US and probably pave the way for the Taliban recognition in the future. The US would be likely interested to work with the Taliban because of Russia and China. Both Moscow and Beijing got close to the Taliban and allowed the Taliban’s diplomats to occupy the embassies of Afghanistan in both Russia and China. If this cooperation with the US is carried out by Taliban unitedly, the advantages would be more than disadvantages as explained above. But if it is done by a faction of the Taliban then there would be more factions among the Taliban and the radical faction including Haqqani network would be more cautious. The rivalry and competition between the Haqqqani and Kandahari factions would turn into animosity leaving no space for cooperation between them and the result would be the Taliban implosion and therefore disintegration.

The killing of Ayman Alzawahiri, the head of Al Qaida would have dire consequences for the Taliban regime. The Taliban proved as violator of the so-called Doha Peace Agreement signed between the US and the Taliban. The incident proved that the Taliban is lying in fighting against extremist terrorists before the international community to secure the recognition for their regime. The incident proved that Taliban is a group of radical extremists that will not change and are totally unreliable. The killing of Chief of Al Qaida revealed the danger of Al Qaida’s revival with the help of the Taliban government and the possibility of repeating the incidents like the 9/11. Finally, if the US and the world leave Afghanistan to its own as they did after the Jihad in 1980s, Afghanistan will turn as the hotbed of radical extremists that would have serious security implication for the region and the world.

 

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